International Cable Protection Committee


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Media Enquiries & Frequently Asked Questions

Updated Wednesday 20 May 2026
We appreciate your interest in the ICPC and the important topic of submarine cable protection.

The ICPC is receiving a high volume of media enquiries, and responses may be delayed and/or prioritised. We may not be able to respond to your enquiry. To support media interest in the topic, we have collated some of the common questions that are asked to support your research. The ICPC has also published Viewpoints and ICPC Best Practices for Governments.

Media FAQs — Strait of Hormuz and Submarine Telecommunications Cables


Q: Why is the Strait of Hormuz important for submarine telecommunications cables?
The Strait of Hormuz is an important regional connectivity corridor supporting communications for countries in the Gulf region and connecting those countries to wider international networks. Multiple submarine cable systems transit the area, including systems with landings in Gulf states and two cables landing in Iran.

Q: Does the Strait of Hormuz carry a significant proportion of global internet traffic?
Some recent media reporting has overstated the extent to which global internet connectivity depends on the Strait of Hormuz.
According to industry analysis by TeleGeography , bandwidth traversing the Strait of Hormuz accounts for less than 1% of international bandwidth globally.
Some figures cited in media reporting regarding Middle East connectivity also relate to broader regional traffic flows — including the Red Sea — rather than specifically to the Strait of Hormuz itself.

Q: Would damage to cables in the Strait of Hormuz disrupt the global internet?
Potential risks associated with submarine cable infrastructure in the Strait of Hormuz are more accurately characterised as regional rather than global in nature.
The Strait remains important for connectivity to countries in the Gulf region. However, modern telecommunications networks are designed with resilience and redundancy, allowing traffic to be rerouted across alternative submarine and terrestrial routes in the event of cable faults or outages.

Q: How many submarine cable systems traverse the Strait of Hormuz?
There are currently five active submarine cable system segments traversing the Strait of Hormuz, together with additional planned systems currently under development.
Many other regional cable systems do not traverse the Strait itself.

Q: How resilient are submarine cable networks?
Submarine cable networks are designed with resilience and redundancy as core operational principles.
Modern networks are highly interconnected, with traffic capable of being rerouted across geographically diverse submarine and terrestrial routes in the event of cable faults or outages. The region is also supported by terrestrial connectivity routes that provide additional redundancy.
Many cable systems serving the Gulf region utilise branching architectures connected to larger international trunk systems. This network design provides additional operational flexibility and resilience and helps minimise the impact of individual cable faults.

Q: How important are submarine cables to global communications?
Submarine telecommunications cables form the backbone of international digital connectivity and carry the vast majority of international data traffic.
Globally, the submarine cable network comprises approximately 500 cable systems and around 1.8 million kilometres of cable infrastructure.

Q: How common are submarine cable faults?
Submarine cable faults are not uncommon operational events.
Industry data indicates that approximately 150–200 submarine telecommunications cable faults occur globally each year. Around 70–80% are caused by accidental human activity, such as commercial fishing activity and ships’ anchors, rather than sabotage.

Q: How are submarine cable faults repaired?
The submarine cable industry maintains a robust and well-established global maintenance framework.
This includes strategically located repair vessels, specialist marine engineering capability, and cooperative maintenance agreements that support efficient repair operations when faults occur.

Q: What is the ICPC’s position on submarine cable protection?
The International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) continues to advocate for government policies that support submarine cable protection and resilience, including timely and efficient permitting processes for cable maintenance and repair operations.
The ICPC also publishes best practices for governments to support the development and protection of submarine telecommunications cables.

Q: What international legal framework applies to submarine cables?
Coastal states have sovereign rights within their territorial waters, including rights relating to activities on the seabed.
Outside territorial seas, including within Exclusive Economic Zones, the ICPC supports the longstanding international legal framework established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which recognises the importance of protecting submarine cables as critical international infrastructure.

Q: What role does cooperation play in cable protection and resilience?
The ICPC encourages continued cooperation between governments and industry to ensure submarine cable systems remain resilient, protected, and capable of rapid repair in the event of damage from any cause.


ICPC Media Factsheet: Submarine Cable Protection & Resilience



Is the number of submarine cable faults increasing over time?
  • The total length of submarine telecommunications cables has increased from 1 million kilometres in 2014 to approximately 1.7 million kilometres in 2025.
  • Despite this expansion, the number of faults has remained stable at around 150–200 incidents per year.
  • 70–80% of faults are caused by accidental human activities, primarily fishing and ship anchors, with the remaining attributed to natural hazards or technical failures.
  • It should be noted that this is specific for submarine telecommunications cables and global statistics are not available for submarine power cables which are more regional in nature

How does the ICPC view concerns about hybrid threats and state actors?
  • The ICPC’s focus is on cable protection at a physical infrastructure level, regardless of the cause of damage.
  • While state-sponsored sabotage remains a risk, accidental damage is the predominant cause of damage to submarine cables.
  • Even if it remains a statistically small cause of damage to submarine cables, sabotage remains important to consider as a risk, and requires close coordination between governments and industry to ensure industry can protect and repair submarine cables.
  • Addressing the primary causes of damage, as well as adopting the ICPC Best Practices also reduces the likelihood and impact of hybrid threats or potential grey zone tactics.
  • ICPC promotes best practices to enhance cable resilience against all threats, whether intentional or accidental.

What actions should governments take to protect submarine cables?
The ICPC has published Government Best Practices for Protecting and Promoting Resilience of Submarine Telecommunications Cables, which outlines measures governments can adopt to safeguard cables. These include:
  • Ensuring timely deployment and repair of submarine cables.
  • Supporting informed policymaking that promotes cable protection.
  • Enhancing the resilience of submarine cables, regardless of the cause of damage.

More specifically the ICPC’s Government Best Practices for Cable Protection & Resilience recommend:
  • Governments should focus on statistically significant risks where action can most effectively reduce damage.
  • Regulatory environments should support multiple and diverse submarine cable landings.
  • Compliance with UNCLOS and customary international law is essential for cable protection.
  • Transparent regulatory regimes should expedite cable deployment and repair.
  • Industry consultation is necessary to align policies with operational realities.
  • Government policies should avoid inadvertently increasing risks to cables.
  • International and regional cooperation is essential for securing cable infrastructure.

Can government/navy patrols effectively prevent submarine cable damage?
  • Cable protection requires multiple measures, including:
    • Preventative strategies such as early-stage route planning and marine awareness programmes.
    • Resilient network design including geographically diverse routes and cable landings to minimise service disruption.
    • Timely repairs with reduced regulatory delays to obtain permits.
  • While patrols may contribute to security efforts, they must be part of a broader protection strategy, coordinated with industry, and seen in the wider context of cable protection and resilience.

Can vessel anchor drags/damage be accidental?
  • Anchors dragged by vessels, especially those underway, present a significant and preventable threat to submarine cables.
  • Submarine cables can suffer damage when anchors are deployed accidentally e.g. through poor seamanship or improper stowage – or they can be deployed intentionally in emergency situations such as adverse weather.
  • Deployment and dragging of an anchor does not imply intent to damage cables – and can occur for a variety of reasons.
  • For more information, please see the ICPC Viewpoint on Damage to Submarine Cables from Dragged Anchors

Has submarine cable damage occurred in the Baltic Sea before 2023?
  • The Baltic Sea has had relatively few cable faults compared to other regions, though a few incidents do occur each year.
  • Damage is typically caused by ships’ anchors in the Baltic due to the water depth, seabed conditions, and typically it is not the result of bottom trawling from commercial fishing activity in many areas.
  • The DKCPC (Danish Cable Protection Committee) was established in 1998 to support cable protection endeavours and reduce the number of cable faults in the Baltic and surrounding waters. The DKCPC coordinates with the ICPC and other regional cable protection committees on the best practices for cable protection and resilience.

Is the Baltic Sea more vulnerable to submarine cable damage than other regions?
  • Cable damage is most common in waters shallower than 300m, especially in areas with:
    • Heavy shipping and fishing activity.
    • High seabed movement due to currents or storms.
  • Therefore, statistically the Baltic may be more prone to cable faults which have typically involved anchor incidents, but due to the active steps that cable operators take in the region to chart cables and promote cable protection good practices, cables fortunately suffer relatively few faults each year.
  • The Baltic has relatively few cable faults, which can attract more attention when they do occur.

Have there been verified cases of state-sponsored submarine cable sabotage?
  • Regarding sabotage by a state, the ICPC does not hold any data on this, but anecdotally we believe that there have not been verified incidents of state sponsored sabotage since World War II.
  • Some historical examples include:
    • 1914 – British forces cut German cables, forcing traffic onto British-controlled networks.
    • 1917-18 – German submarines cut multiple cables, including those linking Britain, the U.S., and Portugal.
  • The potential for sabotage of submarine cables remains a risk that needs to be considered in the context of wider cable protection. There have been some incidents of deliberate or intentional damage via equipment theft or vandalism or incidents where intent cannot be verified. and. However, statistically these incidents are infrequent and represent less than one percent of cable damage globally on an annual basis. The primary causes of cable damage are through accidental human interactions.

Why are many cable damage incidents not publicly disclosed?
  • Most damage does not result in service disruption, as traffic is rerouted immediately.
  • The industry already has a structured approach to facilitate rapid response to repairs utilising cable repair ships that are strategically located around the world.
  • For example considering the incidents in November 2024 in the Baltic, two cables were damaged, there was no disruption or interruption to service, vessels were quickly deployed, and they were both repaired within 2 weeks. While this attracted media attention due to heightened security considerations, this type of incident is generally considered unremarkable.
  • When significant disruptions occur (e.g., Taiwan earthquake in 2008, Tonga volcanic eruption in 2022), they are widely reported in the media as they have a significant impact on people, particularly related to a significant natural event.
  • Cable damage has occurred since the first telegraph cables were laid in the 1800s and is a routine part of the cable industry and operational/maintenance supply chain.

How plausible is it that Baltic Sea cable damage was due to sabotage?
  • The ICPC does not speculate on whether the cause of an incident is accidental or sabotage, nor does the ICPC have a role in investigating the cause.
  • In most circumstances for the cable industry the proactive measures and response are largely the same – which is to
    1. aim to protect cables from being damaged in the first place
    2. minimise disruption - cable owners ensure that they have the ability to quickly reroute traffic to ensure that damage is low impact, and
    3. ensure that cables can be quickly repaired in the event that they are damaged by having repair vessels available that can load cables and jointing equipment and sail to the repair ground without delay.
  • In the specific circumstance that there may be a conflict or heightened risk to the repair vessel or crew, then governments and industry need to collaborate to consider enhanced security or protection for vessels undertaking repairs.

What are the most effective security measures for protecting submarine cables?
  • Preventative steps to reduce accidental damage also enhance overall security.
  • Proper anchoring practices can deter incidents that might otherwise obscure intentional interference.
  • Best practices from the ICPC guide governments and industry in protecting cables from all forms of risk.

How often do submarine cables suffer damage, and what are the main causes?
  • Approx 150–200 cable faults occur annually, which is relatively consist year over year. The total number of cable kilometres deployed globally has increased significantly over time, which represents a reduction in overall global fault rates. This is due to improvements in cable installation and burial techniques as well as detailed route design to avoid higher risk areas.
  • Approx 70–80% are caused by human activities, primarily:
    • Commercial fishing activity.
    • Ships anchors.
  • Other causes include abrasion, equipment failure, and natural hazards such as seafloor currents, storms, submarine landslides, and sediment flows.

How does the recent focus on submarine infrastructure compare to past events?
  • The Nord Stream pipeline incident has increased interest in subsea infrastructure security.
  • However, cable damage has always occurred since cables were first laid in the 1800s, and industry efforts remain focussed on risk reduction, increased knowledge base, and rapid response.
  • The ICPC advocates that governments consider submarine cables as critical digital or underwater infrastructure and promotes close coordination between industry and governments to protect submarine cables.

Does the ICPC have cable route or fault records?
  • The ICPC works closely with cable maintenance zones and private maintenance providers globally to analyse annual fault statistics, particularly repair time analysis.
  • Cable route and fault data is confidential to the cable owner and is not data owned or shared by the ICPC.
  • The ICPC does not have a role in investigating or confirming the cause of cable damage.



If the above does not answer your questions and your media/publishing company would like to reach out for input regarding submarine cable-releated topics, please fill in the form below noting that it may not be possible to respond to immediate deadlines or requests for interviews.
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